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Auctioning Off Integrity:
The Legitimacy of Seller-Rebate Agreements
in the Thoroughbred Auction Context
Daniel Waxman'
Suppose an agent with his principal's knowledge, makes a deal with a seller let's
assume he guarantees seller $300,000 for Hip No. 123, but if there is anything over
$300,000, the overage will be split 50150. The horse remains owned by the seller
all risk of loss stays with the seller until the auction sale, but buyer and seller in this
instance have arrangedfora minimum value of the horse. Is there any real difference
between this and the seller setting a reserve?' [Is this a permissible practice?]
T HE above hypothetical was posed by Mr. William T Bishop 1113 at the
2006 National Equine Law Conference in Lexington, Kentucky. His
presentation, entitled "The Games People Play," outlined a number of
"questionable" practices that are believed to occur with some regularity in
public and private equine transactions. The introduction of this particular
fact pattern, hereinafter referred to as a "seller-rebate agreement,"
4
generated considerable debate among the conference attendees. "In a room
full of lawyers, the responses [to this agreement] ranged from characterizing
the deal as just good business practice, to price-fixing and fraud."5 This
marked divergence of opinion was not the result of conflicting judicial
I J.D. expected zoo8, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 2004, McMaster
University (Ontario, Canada).
2 William T Bishop III, What Happens Commonly in Equine Transactions, UK/CLE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EQUINE LAW § E(b)-3 (2oo6).
3 Mr. Bishop is a partner in the law firm of Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC, where he serves
as the chairman of the firm's Equine Practice Group. He serves as general counsel for nu-
merous important thoroughbred businesses, including the Keeneland Association, Claiborne
Farm, and the Jockey Club. A complete biography is available at http://www.skofirm.com/at-
torney.php?attld=337 (last visited July 2, 2007).
4 For the purposes of this paper, the term "seller-rebate agreement" will be the title
given to any arrangement in which a seller at an auction sale agrees to discount a percentage
of the final bid or provide a fee as consideration for a bidder participating in the auction above
a set price. All examples provided in this paper will assume away any potential impropriety
by agents of the seller or buyer in order to focus on the legality of the agreement itself, rather
than extraneous external matters which are better dealt with by the law of agency.
5 Mary Meehan, Horse Sales Critic Wants More Legislation: Jess Jackson Backs Licensing,
Disclosure, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, May 4, zoo6, at Ai.
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decisions on the matter, nor the moral failings of individual participants,
but was instead the result of the absence of a definitive judicial ruling
on the legality of seller-rebate agreements. 6 The purpose of this article
then is to distill a clear rule from this morass; to determine the propriety of
seller-rebate agreements in the thoroughbred auction context, given the
application of the general principles of contract law and the more specific
nature of the thoroughbred horse industry.
To better achieve this goal this article has been divided into three
separate, yet interdependent, sections. The first section introduces the
reader to the importance of auctions in the thoroughbred industry and
explains the history of (and potential for) abusive bidding practices in
such sales.7 The second section outlines the particular law of auctions,
focusing on the limited, albeit significant, precedents relating specifically
to seller-rebate agreements.8 The final section consists of a policy analysis
of seller-rebate agreements using the general law of auctions as a template
for comparison, balanced against the mores of the thoroughbred auction
market.9 Finally, the author concludes that the utilization of seller-rebate
agreements in the Commonwealth of Kentucky may result in the imposition
of civil liability, but that the thoroughbred industry, (in concert with the
state legislature), should attempt to codify such impropriety so as to assure
the aforementioned result.
I. AUCTIONS & THE THOROUGHBRED INDUSTRY
A. Basics of Thoroughbred Valuation
The economic structure of the thoroughbred industry, in its most basic form,
is founded upon the ability of a horse to run for more or less a mile and to do
so faster than any other horse of its age or gender. ° A horse race, in purely
economic terms (absent considerations of wagering and entertainment
value), is merely an objective methodology for determining the respective
abilities, and thus the respective valuations, of a representative sample of
the thoroughbred horse population." The results of this analysis (i.e. the
6 See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes Io-49 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 50-96 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 97-144 and accompanying text.
io See Robert S. Miller, America Singing: The Role of Custom and Usage in the Thoroughbred
Horse Business, 74 Ky. L.J. 781, 783 (1985).
I I The foregoing economic theory is the work of the author based on his experience as
a buyer and seller of standardbred horses and his continued observation of the thoroughbred
market. It is not the result of a scientific analysis, nor the work of a distinguished econo-
mist-the latter of which is probably sufficiently clear without this proviso. The concepts are
loosely based, however, on the ideas of Robert Miller cited in future footnotes. See generally
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results of the individual race and, perhaps more importantly, the events
which transpire to determine that outcome)" serve to place values or
rankings on the horses within that sample and a cumulative value on the
sample as a whole. The cumulative value of each individual race is then
weighted against the sum of all such races to provide for a more complete
matrix of the value of an individual horse extracted from its initial sample
size. 13 The incentive for the owner of a thoroughbred horse to engage in
this contest of values is quite simple: at the conclusion of each race the
first five horses to cross the finish line are awarded the prize money offered
by the racetrackl 4-a figure which may be as high as six million dollars for
a single race.'" The size of the purse offered is typically representative
of the caliber of the field of horses; the caliber of the field, as indicated
previously, is determined according to the results of previous races. The
more impressively a horse performs in any given race, the more opportunity
he has to race for greater fiscal returns in the future. Thus, the inherently
cyclical nature of this exercise. Taken to its ultimate conclusion then, it is
the ability of any given horse to obtain purse winnings that establishes its
value, and indirectly, the value of all registered thoroughbreds, regardless
of their current racing status. Stallions 6 and broodmares, 17 oftentimes
valued in the tens of millions of dollars, have the sole function of producing
id. at 783-86.
12 The outcome of a horse race is subject to a number of external factors which may over-
ride the true ability of a given horse in a particular race. A horse who finishes behind another
may very well have raced in a more impressive manner than the eventual race winner. Such
factors include the difficulty of the trip, the fractional times of the race, the weight carried by
the horse, the post-position, etc. See e.g., Winning Techniques, CIX THE DAILY RACING FORM
XXX (Spring 2004), available at http://www.drf.com/row/fan-ed/winning-techniques-2004.
pdf.
13 This concept is akin to that of the thoroughbred graded stakes system established by
the Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association in 1973. The purpose of the system is
"to provide owners and breeders of thoroughbred horses a reliable guide to the relative qual-
ity of thoroughbred bloodstock by identifying those U.S. races whose recent renewals have
consistently attracted the highest quality competition." Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders
Association, Member's Guide 2007: An Explanation of the American Graded Stakes Process,
http://www.toba.org/graded-stakes (last visited June 30, 2007).
14 Purse funds are primarily generated via the track's established takeout percentage on
on-site and off-site pari-mutuel wagering, but may be supplemented in some cases by nomi-
nation fees, revenues from alternative gaming sources (in states with race-based video lottery
terminals), sponsorship deals, or state breeding incentives.
15 The $6 million Dubai World Cup is the world's richest horse race. The race is run
at the Nad al Sheba Racecourse in the United Emirates of Dubai and was won in 2007 by
Invasor. See Dubai World Cup: The World's Richest Race Meeting, http://dubairacingclub.
com/dubaiworldcup/index.php?page-id=6 (last visited August 8, 2007).
16 A stallion (or sire) is a male horse used for breeding. THE BLOOD-HORSE AUTHORITATIVE
GUIDE To AUCTIONS 103 (Blood-Horse Publications 2004).
17 A Broodmare is a mare (female horse) that has been bred and is used for breeding
purposes. Id. at 99.
zoo7-2oo8]
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offspring that are able to win these purses. 8 The value of these offspring,
in turn, is based on their potential racing success (i.e., the ability to win
purses) and the probability of their breeding future generations who share
these very same abilities. 19 It is a highly speculative endeavor, but one
founded on a dreadfully simple equation: speed = dollars.
The marketplace in which these economic transactions occur is
somewhat unique in that it has been effectively bifurcated into a private
and a public component."0 While private sales represent a significant
contribution to the overall thoroughbred economy, it is the public auction
market that is the true barometer of an individual thoroughbred's worth."'
Thoroughbred auction sales provide a focus for the industry, a sort of state
of the union type quality that simply cannot be replicated by a matrix
of one-on-one transactions. Their significance is not merely economic
(although that is their primary function), it is inherently social.2" Auction
sales, however large or small, have a public function that deeply affects all
segments of the thoroughbred economy.2 3
B. Auctions
The annual thoroughbred auction market in the United States is comprised
of the sale and purchase of approximately 20,000 horses at 150 individual
sales for gross revenues in excess of 1.13 billion dollars.2 4 The most famous
(and most monetarily significant) of these auctions are those conducted by
the Keeneland Association 5 in Lexington, Kentucky, and by Fasig-Tipton
18 Miller, America Singing, supra note to, at 783.
t9 Id. at 784.
2o Robert S. Miller, The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests: A Transactional Approach, 78 Ky.
L.J. 517, 544 (1990).
z Id. at 544-45.
22 According to Charles W. Smith, "auctions are social processes capable of defining and
resolving inherently ambiguous situations" and "are manifestly concerned with generating
and maintaining social relations and values and [providing] a means for understanding the
role [they] play in what might appear to be purely economic transactions." CHARLES W. SMITH,
AUCTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VALUE 3.14 (University of California Press 1989).
One need only witness the pomp and circumstance of the Keeneland September Yearling Sale
to gain a true appreciation for the above passage.
23 Miller, America Singing, supra note iO, at 535.
24 DEAN, DORTON & FORD, P.S.C., 2005: EQUINE BUSINESS YEAR IN REVIEW 4-5, available
at http://www.ddfky.com/DDF-EBYRo5.pdf (last visited August 8, 2007). Thoroughbred
horses are generally auctioned according to their age and purpose. Yearling sales constitute
the lion's share of the auction market with total sales of $553,928,546 per year (or $54,910
per yearling), followed by broodmares at $264,o17,792 (a $54,572 average), two-year-olds at
$19o,888,903 (a $60,851 average), and weanlings at $79,37o,644 (a $43,716 average). THE
JOCKEY CLUB, 2uu6 FACT BOOK: A GUIDE TO THE THOROUGHBRED INDUSTRY IN NORTH AMERICA
22, http://www.jockeyclub.com/factbook.asp (last visited March 12, 2007).
25 See Keeneland Sales, http://www.keeneland.com/livesales (last visited June 30, 2007).
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Inc.,2 6 which conducts sales at numerous locations, but holds its major
select auctions 7 in Saratoga, New York, and Lexington, Kentucky.8 Other
major American auctions are held by the Ocala Breeders' Sales Company
in Florida and by Barretts in California. 9 State breeders' associations
administer many of the smaller more regional auctions, which tend to be
limited to horses foaled within a particular state and or horses eligible for
that state's breeders' incentive programs.3" Despite the vast expansion of
the auction market from its initial isolated existence in Kentucky and New
York to its current nationwide status,31 one cannot conceivably overstate the
significance of Kentucky's auctions to the overall thoroughbred industry. In
2005 nearly 60% of the total gross revenues from the auction of thoroughbred
horses in the United States were derived from sales conducted in the
state of Kentucky.3" (This figure would increase even more substantially
if one were to include horses bred and raised in Kentucky, but eventually
auctioned in other states). As such, the choice of Kentucky law as the basis
for this article and the use of sales regulations promulgated by Keeneland
and Fasig Tipton is in no way symptomatic of any innate regional bias
on the part of the author, but rather, the pertinence of the state in the
thoroughbred auction context.33 The "law" of thoroughbred horse racing,
for all intents and purposes, is the law of the state of Kentucky.
C. History of Banditry
The history of the thoroughbred auction market and the thoroughbred
industry in general, is one that has been marred by a persistent veil of
26 See Fasig-Tipton Company Inc., http://www.fasigtipton.com/about/history.htm (last
visited June 30, 2007).
27 A select sale is a public auction in which the entrants are pre-examined by expert
appraisers and are only accepted into the sale if they meet specified criteria for pedigree and
confirmation. JACK LOHMAN & ARNOLD KIRKPATRICK, SUCCESSFUL THOROUGHBRED INVESTMENT
IN A CHANGING MARKET 78 (Thoroughbred Publishers Inc., 1984).
28 THE BLOOD-HORSE AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 16, at 19.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 2o.
31 For a more complete indication of the nationwide character of the United States'
thoroughbred auction scene, see Thoroughbred Times, Auction Results, http://www.thorough-
bredtimes.com/sales/auctions.aspx (last visited June 30, 2007).
32 See Kentucky Equine Education Project (KEEP), Kentucky Equine Economy,
http://www.horseswork.com/facts.htm (last visited August 8, 2007).
33 Dan Metzger, president of the Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association
(TOBA) stated the following in reference to pending thoroughbred legislation in Kentucky:
"We (TOBA) have to be careful about getting involved with "local" issues, but Kentucky
is the centerpiece of the industry. This is not only of national significance, but internation-
al significance as well." Ryan Conley, Compromise Tables Legislation Backed by Jackson, THE




underhanded dealing and questionable ethics.-' Since horse sales began in
North America there have been whispers of false bidders who conspire with
agents to run up the prices of horses as they pass through the sales ring.3"
Rumors circulate of backroom deals between buyers and sellers, trainers
and agents, all intended to "indoctrinate" wealthy newcomers to the sport.
Rather than existing in the shadows (as one might rationally expect), these
practices are viewed by many industry participants as a part of the "charm"
of thoroughbred racing - an enviable renaissance of capitalism in its truest
form.36 One can do no better than to cite the following parable:
A wealthy industrialist came down to Kentucky, with a notion of getting into
the horse business. "I've got plenty of money," he told a number of people,
"what I need is someone in the horse business with some experience to
help me out." Sure enough as you might expect would happen to anyone
going around advertising he had plenty of money, the wealthy industrialist
found someone with experience in the horse business. It also wasn't much
more than a year before the industrialist had to admit to a friend, "It wasn't
too long before he had the money and I had the experience." 37
The colloquial use of the term "horse-trader," meant to describe an
individual who conducts his business in an unfair and devious manner,38
(much like the individual above) is symptomatic of this unfavorable, albeit
not entirely undeserved, reputation. Illicit practices are certainly not
unique to the horse industry-under-the-table deals are presumably part
of any business where people and money are involved, and the process
of valuation is so inherently uncertain. But it is the nature of the typical
horseman-the propensity to gamble, to challenge the odds, to seek every
34 See generally Joe Drape, A Horseman's Lawsuit Puts Trading Practices in the Spotlight, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2oo6, at Di; Ray Paulick, Buyer Beware, THE BLooD-HORSE, April 3, 2004, at
1953; Ray Paulick, Jackson To Push For Licensing of Bloodstock Agents, THE BLOOD-HORSE, May
4, 2oo6, available at http://www.bloodhorse.com/viewstoryplain.asp?id=33391; Janet Patton
& Mary Meehan, Shady Dealing Has Been Hardto Rein In, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, March
26, 2oo6, at Aj; Jon Newbury, Horse Buyer: System Crooked, THE CINCINNATI POST, May 15, 2oo6,
at Ai; Keith Chamblin, On Integrity of Sales, THE BLOOD-HORSE, March I6 1985, at 1942.
35 Drape, supra note 34.
36 Tom LaMarra, Panel: Ethics Code for Horse Sales Needs Teeth, THE BLOOD--HoRsE, Dec.
19, 2004, available at http://www.bloodhorse.com/viewstory-plain.asp?id=25743. "Baugh said
the industry must get past the notion that horse trading-and the potential rip-offs associated
with it-is romantic and an accepted part of the process." Id. One of the most vocal propo-
nents of this view is former Kentucky Governor Brereton C. Jones who stated the following
about under the table payments in a recent deposition: "That is the beauty of the free-enter-
prise system, that you have the right to reward people who do business with you .... I have
done it on a few occasions. Quite frankly, I will continue to do so." Drape, supra note 34.
37 LOHMAN & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 27, at 15.
38 Drew Kershen, Horse Tradin': Legal Implications of Livestock Auction Bidding Practices, 37
ARK. L. REV. I 19, 12o (1983).
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conceivable edge-that has multiplied the influence and prevalence of
these transactions in the thoroughbred industry.39 "If you've got a little
larceny in your heart," one consignor warns, "you have a lot of opportunity
to cheat people."40
D. Attempts at Reform
The past three years, however, have been witness to a concerted movement
to improve the ethical environment of the thoroughbred auction scene. In
2004, prominent horse owner Satish Sanan decided to boycott the annual
yearling sales in order to demonstrate to the industry that kickbacks and
other fraudulent behavior would no longer be tolerated by the sport's
leading buyers. 41 "There is just so much, I don't want to use the word
corruption, but underhanded deals that go on in this industry," Sanan told a
trade publication at the time; "frankly some of the people involved in this
kind of behavior are so powerful that they kind of control the industry. 4
Sanan's frustration led to the creation of the Alliance for Industry Reform
(AIR), an initiative he founded in late 2004 to motivate the racing industry
to resolve the problems associated with its sales.41 In response to Sanan's
persistent urging, the Thoroughbred Owners & Breeders Association
(TOBA) formed a Sales Integrity Task Force to address these concerns
under more official auspices. Under the chairmanship of Cot Campbell'
and with the assistance of Sanan, the task force issued their findings in
December 2004. The group adopted a code of ethics dealing with dual
agency, crafted a model buyer-agent disclosure agreement, established
39 Miller, America Singing, supra note Io, at 785-90. Miller speaks of the typical horseman
as the singular confluence of the bandit and the saint, at once entirely ethical and unspeakably
deviant. Id. There is, from the experience of this author, much truth to that statement.
40 Chamblin, On Integrity of Sales, supra note 34 (quoting Carl Bowling, owner of
Straightaway Farm).
41 Seegenerally Mark Simon, Time to Level the Sales Playing Field, THOROUGHBRED Ti MES, July
24 2004, at 16; News Updates: Sanan to Boycott Select Yearling Sales, THOROUGHBRED TMES, July
I 2004, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/todaysnews/newsview-print.asp?recno=46863;
Ray Paulick, Agents For Change, THE BLOOD-HoRsE, March 21 2006, at 1795; Ray Paulick,
Ethics ForSale, THE BLoOD-HORsE, July 14, 2004, at 3819; Tom LaMarra, Sanan: Regulation of
Sales Business Needs Teeth, THE BLOoD-HORsE, July 4, 2004, available at http://www.bloodhorse.
com/viewstory-plain.asp?id=23256.
42 Patton & Meehan, supra note 34.
43 Letters: Satish Sanan, It's Time to Clean House, THE B LOoD-H-oRsE, April 17, 2004, 2182;
LaMarra, Sanan: Regulation of Sales Business Needs Teeth, supra note 41; Paulick, Ethics for Sale,
supra note 41.
44 For a biography of W. Cothran "Cot" Campbell, see Interview With Cot Campbell,




disclosure guidelines for veterinary procedures, and created a buyer
education program.45
The TOBA code of ethics was met with mixed opinion and mixed
results, however, and the momentum for reform seemed to slow substantially
in 2005. 6 That is until California winemaker Jess Jackson ("who like
Sanan several years earlier entered the industry with deep pockets and
big dreams")47 filed a lawsuit against his former advisors, claiming that he
had been defrauded in the purchase of numerous thoroughbred yearlings.4"
In addition to the suit, Jackson began a vigorous nationwide campaign to
change the basic manner in which the Kentucky thoroughbred industry
conducts its business. Jackson's campaign has culminated in the passage
of HB 446 (a Kentucky law forbidding dual agency), but his quest for
reform continues. 49 The significance of these efforts for the purposes of
this Note is the context in which they place the propriety of seller-rebate
agreements. This analysis cannot take place in a vacuum, but instead,
must be conducted according to the prevailing norms of the thoroughbred
industry-the current tenor of reform must be considered if one is to
develop a meaningful examination of this practice.
II. AUCTION LAW
A. Basic Contractual Framework
An auction is defined as a public sale of property by means of competitive
bidding.5" The "fall of the hammer" at the conclusion of such bidding
signifies the formation of a binding contract between the seller and the
45 See Thoroughbred Owners & Breeders Association Sales Integrity Task Force, http://
www.salesintegrity.org/home.html (last visited March 12, 2007); Dan Liebman & Deirdre
Biles, Code of Ethics for Auctions Announced, ThE BLOoD-HoRsE, December I6, 2004, available
at http://www.bloodhorse.com/viewstory-plain.asp?id=2583 I.
46 See Deirdre Biles, Code of Ethics Introduced, THE BLOoD-HoRsE, December 25, 2004,
at 7339; Cot Campbell, Integrity No Easy Task, THE BLOoD-HORsE, January 15, 2005, at 394;
Paulick, Buyer Beware, supra note 34.
47 Paulick, Buyer Beware, supra note 34.
48 Newberry, supra note 34; Ray Paulick, Jones Defends Payment of Commissions to Former
Jackson Adviser, ThE BLOoD-HoRsE, March 17, 2oo6, available at http://www.bloodhorse.com/
viewstory-plain.asp?id=32618; Drape, supra note 34.
49 See e.g., Ray Paulick, Jackson to Push For Licensing of Bloodstock Agents, supra note 34;
Deirdre Biles, Thoroughbred Industry Reacts Positively to Jackson Legislation, THE BLOoD-HORsE,
January 27, 2006, available at http:www.bloodhorse.com/viewstory-plain.asp?id=31943.
50 Leonard D. DuBoff, Auction Problems: Going Going Gone, 26 CLEV. ST. L REv. 499, 500(1977)-
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buyer,5 with the auctioneer serving as the agent of both parties.5" The
act of bidding is said to constitute an offer by the putative buyer, and the
acceptance and ratification of the final bid by the auctioneer is deemed
to be an effective acceptance of that offer.53 Like any other contract, a
purchase at auction is to be enforced according to its terms.54 Thus, the
mere tip of a hat or nod of a head in the sales arena55 is considered not only
an offer to purchase at a stated price, but an offer to purchase according to
the litany of terms and conditions published in the auction catalogue.56 In
Kentucky, the purchase of a thoroughbred horse at auction is considered a
commercial transaction, 57 and as such, is governed by Kentucky's version of
the Uniform Commercial Code.58 The Code acts in concert with the stated
terms and conditions of the particular sale to create the legal framework
under which any public equine transaction occurs.5 9
B. Reserves
There are generally two methods for a seller to offer property for sale at an
auction: either with reserve or without reserve. 6° In an auction with reserve
the seller establishes a minimum value under which he will not permit
51 David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Auction Sales Under §UCC 2-328,44 A.L. R. 4th I] o,
§ z(a) (1986).
52 The role of the auctioneer is an exception to the general rule that a party may not
act as agent for both sides in a transaction. 3A LARRY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-328 tO -329 (3d ed. 1985). Kentucky's dual agency legislation makes
this fact explicit: "auction companies shall not be deemed to be dual agents for all purposes
under this section." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(8) (West 2OO6).
53 LAWRENCE, supra note 52, §§ 2-328 to -329.
54 Minneman, supra note 5 1, § 2(b).
55 Bids may be entered by creative signals arranged between the bidder and the auction-
eer to conceal the fact that an individual is bidding. In that vein, auction bidders have been
described as "hand-wavers, head-nodders, shouters, pencil-flickers, eye-blinkers, ear-tug-
gers, and lapel-flippers." DuBoff, supra note 50, at 503 n.24.
56 See, e.g., 2006 Keeneland April Two Year Olds in Training Sale, Conditions of Sale,
First Condition ("This sale is governed by these Conditions of Sale ... All sellers, consign-
ors, agents, owners, prospective bidders/buyers, all other interested parties and all sales are
therefore bound by and subject to the provisions of the Conditions of Sale as set forth in this
catalogue and Announcements"). The conditions of sale are the rules and regulations that
cover business ranging from extension of credit to resolution of bidding disputes and other
particulars. See, e.g., id.
57 Cohen v. N. Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1265, 1272 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
58 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. section 355.2-328 is a direct codification of section .2-328 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which deals with sales by means of auction. Compare Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 355.2-328 with U.C.C. § 2-328 (1992). These UCC provisions are supplemented
by Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. section 330.2 10, which specifically addresses the sale of horses by auc-
tion in Kentucky.
59 SeeCohen, 712 E Supp. at 1269.
60 DuBoff, supra note 5o , at 508.
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the auctioneer to sell the property;61 in an auction without reserve there
is no such "upset" price.6 "If I place a reserve of $350,000 on a horse I
would be happy if someone bid $351,000 on the horse," explains Duncan
Taylor of Taylor Made Sales Agency.63 "The reserve is not necessarily the
price we think the individual is worth but any bid over the set reserve is
the price we are willing to let the horse be sold for."'  Under Kentucky
law, a sale by auction is presumed to be with reserve unless it is explicitly
stated prior to the auction that it is, in fact, without reserve.65 Setting a
reserve is purely voluntary on the part of the consignor, although by
conservative estimates, more than 80% of all horses that enter the auction
ring in Kentucky do so subject to a reserve.66 American auctioneers have
generally adopted the policy of permitting concealed reserve bids, 67 and
section 330.210 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated specifically
provides that an auctioneer "shall not be required to announce at any
with-reserve sale when the reserve is attained. ' 68 Despite this statutory
permission, if a horse fails to reach its reserve bid, that fact must be noted in
the official sales results and the hammer price of the horse excluded from
any published cumulative totals, so as to prevent any undue distortion of
the auction market.69
61 Id.
62 See Feaster Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Park-Davis Auctioneers, Inc., 505 P.2d 612, 616
(Kan. 1973). In an auction without reserve the seller is obligated after the bidding has begun
to sell to the highest bidder and cannot withdraw the property after that time. Ky REV. STAT.
ANN. § 355.2-328(2).
63 Keith Chamblin, Reserving the Right to Define Reserve, THE BLOOD-HORSE, March 23,
1985, at 2108 (quoting Duncan Taylor).Taylor Made Sales Agency is regularly the largest con-
signor of thoroughbreds at auction in the United States. Taylor Made led all consignors by
gross receipts in every thoroughbred auction held in Kentucky in 2oo6. See Taylor Made,
http://www.taylormadefarm.com/public-sales (last visited June 23, 2007).
64 Chamblin, Reserving the Right to Define Reserve, supra 63 at 21o8 (quoting Duncan
Taylor).
65 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-328(2).
66 Chamblin, Reserving the Right to Define Reserve, supra note 63, at 21o9 (quoting Rogers
Beasley, Keeneland Director of Sales).
67 Id. at 2 io8; DuBoff, supra note 5o , at 508-09.
68 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330.210(3).
69 See, e.g., 2007 Keeneland January Horses of All Ages Sale, Monday Session Results,
http://apps.keeneland.com/data/session.asp?SalelD=2007o4&Session=i (last visited July
8, 2007) ("Number of Head Sold, Number of Shares Sold, Number of Seasons Sold, Gross
Amount and Average DO NOT INCLUDE RNA's (RNA - Reserve Not Attained)"). The




C. Puffing and Chilling
As a general principle, sellers and their agents are not permitted to bid
on property they have entered in an auction sale.70 Individuals who are
employed for such a purpose are known primarily as puffers, but may also
be known as by-bidders, cappers, decoy ducks, sham-bidders, or white
bonnets.71 A "puffer" in the strictest meaning of the word, is a person who,
without having any intention to purchase an item, is employed by the seller
to raise the price by fictitious bids, thereby increasing competition, while
he himself is secured from the risk of purchase by an understanding with
the seller that he shall not be bound by his bids.7" The employment of a
puffer is a legal fraud upon legitimate bidders,73 and entitles a successful
bidder to rescind the auction contract or take the goods at the last good
faith bid prior to the completion of the sale.7" Puffing or buy-bidding is
considered fraudulent because "it undermine[s] the fairness, openness,
and competitive determinations of price which are meant to be the
distinguishing characteristics of auctions as market mechanisms."" There
is no such fraud, however, if all buyers are notified in advance of the sale
that the right to bid has been reserved by all sellers and their disclosed or
undisclosed agents.7 6 The terms and conditions of sale for auctions held at
both Keeneland and Fasig Tipton include such by-bidding provisions,77
and thus one cannot legitimately bring an action for "puffing" at a public
sale of a thoroughbred horse in Kentucky.78
70 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-328(4).
71 Manuel v. Halesden, 268 S.W. 554, 556 (Ky. 1925).
72 Peck v. List, 1883 WL 3306, at *23 (W. Va. Dec. 20, 1883).
73 For a complete history of the origins of "puffing" as a cause of action, beginning with
its roots in England's Equity Courts to its adoption by the United State's Supreme Court, see
id.; McMillan v. Harris, 35 S.E. 334 (Ga. 19oo).
74 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-328(4).
75 Kershen, supra note 38, at 123.
76 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-328(4).
77 2OO6 Keeneland April Two Year Olds in Training Sale, Conditions of Sale, Second
Condition (Applicable Governing Law: "In accordance with KRS §330.2 1o and §355.2-328(4)
and other applicable laws, the right to bid in this sale is reserved for all sellers, including
their disclosed and undisclosed agents, unless otherwise announced at time of sale. Buyers
therefore agree and acknowledge that sellers . . . have the right to conduct buy-bidding as
related to their entries"); 2006 Fasig-Tipton November Selected Mixed Sale, Conditions of
Sale, First Condition (Applicable Law: "All horses in this sale are offered according to the
laws of the state wherein the sale is conducted. The right to bid, as provided under the law,
is reserved for all Consignors, including owners and their agents, unless otherwise announced
by Auctioneer").
78 This is not to say that the concept of puffing is insignificant-the analysis of puffing
agreements establishes an archetype for the analysis of seller-rebate agreements, as one is
able to draw effective parallels between the policy concerns that illuminate both practices.
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If puffing represents one pole of illegality in the auction setting, the
opposite pole is represented by conduct stifling competition or bid-chilling.
This behavior includes agreements between prospective bidders not to
compete,7 9 words or actions intended to discourage bidding and disparage
the property, or any other bidding technique which unfairly diminishes the
price ultimately paid for the item being auctioned.80 While puffing uses
artificial competition to inflate the price to the advantage of the seller and
the detriment of the buyer, bid-chilling dampens competition and thus
decreases the price to the benefit of the buyer and the disadvantage of
the seller.8" Regardless of the identity of the aggrieved party however, any
agreement entered into with the intention of secretly altering prices at an
auction sale (whether by raising or lowering such prices) is fraudulent as
a matter of law.8 This blanket statement clearly covers both puffing and
bid-chilling, but it is also meant to encompass any other activity which
cannot be conveniently shoehorned into either category. It would appear
that the use of a seller-rebate agreement would be just such an activity, but
without a more direct judicial statement to that effect, it is perhaps unwise
to be so unduly categorical.
D. Seller-Rebate Agreements
While a seller-rebate agreement is a clear attempt to manipulate the
auction market to the economic advantage of the seller and the rebate
buyer,83 it is not an agreement to stifle bidding," nor can it be labeled a
traditional puffing agreement.85 Nonetheless, the handful of courts that
have addressed rebate agreements, even tangentially, have looked upon
79 The most nefarious type of collusion practiced at auction sales is the use of bidding
rings or bidding cartels. This practice occurs when a group of potential bidders agree to select
one member of their group to bid on goods at an auction sale, and then conduct a "knock-out"
auction to reapportion the goods within the ring. The difference between the price paid at
public auction and that paid at the private knock out auction is divided among the members
of the ring. DuBoff, supra note 5o , at 506. The secret reserve system was established, in large
part, to combat such techniques.
8o Kershen, supra note 38, at 164.
81 See Comment, Agreementsfor Fictitious Bids atAuction, 31 YALE L.J. 431 (192 1).
82 7 AM. JUR. 2D Auctions andAuctioneers § 30 (2007).
83 Kershen, supra note 38, at 166.
84 The practical purpose of a seller-rebate agreement is to generate increased bidding
and thus garner greater returns for the seller. Id. This is entirely contrary to the notion of bid
stifling which is intended to reduce bidding activity.
85 Rebate bidders are persons who will in fact be held accountable for some price within
the range of bids entered at the auction. Hence, rebate bidders are not technically puffers
because puffers are those persons who enter completely fictitious bids for which they are not
at all accountable. Id.
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such secret negotiations with considerable distaste.16 No court has directly
ruled on the legality of seller-rebate agreements, however, and even those
courts that have spoken against them with the most vehemence have not
done so in a context in which seller by-bidding has also been permitted.
As such, the parallels drawn in such cases between the effect of puffing
agreements and those of seller-rebate agreements must be tempered to a
certain degree, if not simply examined with a more heightened particularity.
This statutory allowance of by-bidding and its attendant consequences does
not render an examination of seller-rebate agreements wholly superfluous
however. A contractual decision to permit by-bidding does not constitute
an equivalent decision to permit the use of seller-rebate agreements (or
any other of the panoply of secret devices one may conceive of to inflate
the price at an auction sale). Simply because puffing (or by-bidding) is
permitted it does not necessarily follow that rebate agreements are equally
permissible, especially when one considers that it is the disclosure of the
puffing behavior that grants it its legitimacy, and not the propriety of the
activity itself. Although both Keeneland and Fasig Tipton do provide the
necessary disclosures for by-bidding practices (as noted previously), there
are no such disclosures for seller-rebate agreements, and it remains to be
seen whether any such disclosure would even be sufficient to remove the
taint of impropriety presented by such an agreement. The existing case
law is scarce and far from dispositive, but viewed in its totality it is, at the
very least, instructive and thus worthy of further review.
E. Case Law
In the case of Osborn v. Apperson Lodge, a purchaser of land at auction sought
rescission of the auction contract on the basis of puffing through the use
of rebate bidders.87 The Kentucky Court of Appeals expressed a general
disapproval of rebate agreements, but ruled that the purchaser had no cause
of action because the price of the specific lot which he had purchased had
not been influenced by the use of these rebate bidding practices. 88 The
court implied, however, that the purchaser may have had a cause of action
if the sale in which he had purchased the lot had in fact been influenced
by rebate bidding.89
Kentucky's highest court was faced with another seller-rebate
agreement just two years later in the case of Robenson v. Yann.90 In that
86 See generally Osborn v. Apperson Lodge, 281 SW. 500 (Ky. 1926); Robenson v. Yann, 5
S.W.zd 271 (Ky. 1928); Jennings v. Jennings, io8 S.E. 340 (S.C. 1921), Peck v. List, 1883 WL
3306 (W. Va. Dec. 20, 1883) (explaining the case of Bexwellv. Christie, I Cow. 395).
87 Osborn, 281 SW. at 5oi-o2.
88 Id. at 502.
89 Id. at 502-03.
90 See Robenson v. Yann, 5 S.W.ad. 271 (Ky. 1928).
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instance, a rebate bidder sued the seller for specific performance of the
auction contract at the discounted rebate price.91 The court refused to order
the requested specific performance, stating that the agreement between
the parties could not have been entered into "except to deceive somebody,
if nobody else, the other bidders at the sale," and as such, they would leave
the parties where they had placed themselves.9"
In Jennings v. Jennings, a rebate bidder sued an auction seller to collect the
compensation promised to him by the seller if the bids were raised above a
certain level. 93 The South Carolina Supreme Court held that although the
rebate agreement was "of doubtful wisdom and propriety" and may even
be "violative of the implied guarantee that all public sales are genuine,"
they did not believe that the validity of the practice needed to be adjudged
in the particular case as no good faith bidder was a complainant in the
action. 94
The most stinging rebuke of seller-rebate agreements came in dicta in
the English case of Bexwellv. Christie- the case cited by the United States
Supreme Court as the "pole-star" of judicial decisions outlawing puffing at
auction sales, and thus one that should be granted considerable weight in
any potential analysis.95 In that case Lord Mansfield opined as follows:
Suppose there was an agreement privately with a particular person, that if
he was the highest bidder, so much would be abated; frequently abatements
from the price fixed by the vendor are made on a private sale of course
legitimately; sometimes ten or fifteen percent is thus abated. But a private
agreement of this sort between the owner and the bidder, at a sale by auction
would be a grossfraud.96
Not one of the above cases however, involved a fact situation in which a
court was directly faced with a lawsuit between a good faith purchaser and
a seller who utilized a rebate agreement at an auction sale. These cases
do not provide an answer; they merely provide a context for subsequent
examination, and offer a clue as to the judicial sentiment which would
illuminate a future decision if the issue were ever presented to a court in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. What follows, therefore, is not necessarily a
statement of the law as it currently exists, but is instead a survey of the legal
and policy factors that may weigh against the validity of these agreements
if such an action were ever conceivably entertained at the judicial level.
91 Id. at 272.
92 Id. at 273.
93 Jennings v. Jennings, io8 S.E. 340, 340 (S.C. 1921).
94 Id. at 341.
95 Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. 134, 154 (185o).
96 Peck v. List, 1883 WL 3306, at *23 (W. Va. Dec. 20, 1883) (quoting Bexwell v. Christie,




A. Free and Fair Competition
An essential element of an auction sale is the opportunity for free and fair
competition among bidders.9 7 Any agreement between buyer and seller or
between buyers that is "unfairly restrictive of that opportunity is against
public policy and void."98 All bidders at an auction sale have a right to
suppose that they are bidding on equal terms, 99 and thus, even though the
owner of property sold at auction has thc. right to prescribe the manner,
terms, and conditions of sale, 100 these announced terms may not be varied
as to a particular bidder by prior agreement with him.101 The price of a
horse (or any other good sold at auction) is to be determined by competitive
bidding, not competitive dealmaking.
The statutory authorization forconcealed reserve prices and the disclosed
seller self-bidding that is standard in today's thoroughbred auction market 02
does nothing to eliminate this fairness requirement. Instead, it merely sets
the parameters within which "free and fair competition" is to take place.
Reserves may be set, sellers may bid, and yet all bona fide buyers must
stand upon equal footing. 1°3 Whatever one's opinion of the desirability of
secret reserves or disclosed by-bidding, there can be no dispute that both
practices affect all potential buyers equally. If they are egregious practices,
(and many believe they are),'O° then all are equally aggrieved.
For instance, assume a situation in which Buyer X and Buyer Y both
wish to purchase Seller Z's horse at an auction sale. Seller Z has placed a
$300,000 reserve on the horse and has authorized his undisclosed agent to
bid up to $500,000 on his behalf. Buyers X and Y are thus subject to the
same pattern of inflationary bidding by the seller up to $500,000;05 neither
is advantaged in any way and neither will be able to purchase the horse for
97 See Feaster Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Parks-Davis Auctioneers, Inc., 505 P.2d. 612, 616
(Kan. 1973); Manhattan Taxi Serv. Corp. v. Checker Cab Mfg. Corp., 171 N.E. 705, 707 (N.Y.
1930).
98 Manhattan Taxi Serv. Corp., 171 N.E. at 707.
99 Peck, 1883 WL 3306, at 28 (quoting Hopkins v. Tanqueray, 15 Com. Bench 130 (8o
Eng. Com. Law)).
ioo 7 AM. JUR. zo Auctions andAuctioneers § 17 (2007).
1o Id.
102 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
103 7 AM. JUR. 2D Auctions andAuctioneers § 17 (2007).
io4 For a representative critique of the reserve system, see DuBoff, supra note 5o, at
510-12.
1o5 Buyers X and Y are subject to bids from both the auctioneer and the seller's agent
on the seller's behalf, in addition to other good faith bids up to $300,000. Subsequent to that,
they are subject to bids from the agent and the other good faith bidders from $300,000 to
$500,0oo, and subject only to bids from other good faith bidders from $500,000 on.
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any figure below that price. Beyond $500,000, however, the ownership of
the horse will be determined solely by the valuations placed on the animal
by the bidders, and their respective financial abilities. If Buyer X is willing
to bid $550,000, and Buyer Y is willing to pay $560,000, then the horse will
belong to Buyer Y, and he will be responsible for the full value of that bid.
This notion of supply and demand is the very essence of a sale by auction.
At the conclusion of the bidding the property is to go to the party who is
willing to pay the highest price 10 6 - it is the necessary result of free and fair
competition, and is the founding principle of economic auction theory.107
This basic principle is undermined, however, if one is to utilize a
seller-rebate agreement. Assume the same hypothetical as above, except
instead of Seller Z authorizing his agent to bid $500,000, he enters into an
arrangement with Buyer X whereby X agrees to bid $500,000 for the horse,
and buyer and seller will divide any sum in excess of that threshold 50/50
regardless of the eventual purchaser. As above, Buyer X is still only willing
and able to pay $550,000 for the horse, whereas Buyer Y is still willing and
able to pay $560,000. All else being equal, the horse should once again
belong to Buyer Y at the conclusion of the auction for he is the party willing
to pay the highest price. In this instance, however, Buyer X's previous
$550,000 limit has been converted into the ability to bid as high $600,000
as a result of his agreement with the seller. From $500,000 forward Buyer
X is essentially bidding with fifty cent dollars-his financial responsibility
for each bid is fifty percent less in every case than that of Buyer Y. If
he bids $570,000 he will, under the facts of this hypothetical, be able to
purchase the horse, (Buyer Y having reached his limit), and yet he will only
truly be responsible for a sum of $535,000. Fairness in the auction context
does not mean absolute equality-certain buyers have larger budgets,
others are able to establish more favorable payment terms with the sales
company 1 0 --but one cannot speak of fairness in any meaningful sense
when a single buyer is to be held responsible for only half of the dollar
value of his bid. Fairness simply cannot be the label one gives to a scenario
in which $535,000 is suddenly adjudged to be a more significant sum than
$550,000. A seller-rebate agreement clearly violates the basic notion of an
auction as a free and fair competition between equally situated bidders.
IO6 Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N.H. 360, 367 (1851).
i07 "In an ascending auction, price and allocation are determined in an open competi-
tion among the bidders. The bidders willing to pay the most win and pay prices that no other
bidders are willing to top." Peter Cramton, Ascending Auctions, 42:3-5 EUROPEAN ECON. REV.
745, 746 (1998); see also R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, XXV
JOURNAL OF ECON. LIT. 699, 721-22 (1987).
io8 THE BLOOD-HORSE AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 16, at 43;
Keeneland Sales Buyer Registration Form/Credit Application, http://www.keeneland.com/




The economic impact of an auction sale extends far beyond the sum of
the individual transactions that constitute the sale itself.10 9 The price paid
for any one item at an auction directly effects the valuation of other items
to be sold at that auction and related goods in the non-auction market.110
Thoroughbred buyers use the prices paid at auction to assist them in
making judgments about the worth of similar horses,' to determine the
value of the stallions and mares that have produced these individuals,12
and to assess collateral appraisals for the secured loans that are the lifeblood
of the thoroughbred industry."3 "In short, auctions have a public function
that deeply affects broader segments of the thoroughbred economy."1 4 As
such, the accurate reporting of auction prices is a crucial element in the
maintenance of a legitimately valued equine market. It is to this end that
sales companies are required to exclude from their totals the hammer price
of individual horses that did not meet their reserve bid, and to indicate this
fact on the published summary of sale." 5 This practice serves to ensure
that buyers are not misled into believing that items have been sold for
prices higher than they were able to bring. It also protects other potential
sellers from overstating the value of their own goods and subsequently
setting unrealistic reserve prices. If a horse is purchased by a bidder who
has entered into a seller-rebate agreement with a vendor, the price listed in
the official sales results will not accurately reflect the actual value paid for
the horse. This situation is no different than when a horse fails to reach its
reserve bid and thus should be treated no differently. In fact, the improper
reporting of rebate purchases is more likely to distort the overall market, as
the eventual change in the horse's registered ownership post-sale to a bona
fide third party is likely to remove any specter of impropriety that would
otherwise exist.
The published price of a horse purchased via a rebate agreement
misleads others in the marketplace (owners, breeders, and equine lenders
respectively), as to what they should pay for comparable individuals, what
they can legitimately charge for a breeding to a stallion, or how much they
should lend to a particular industry participant. At an even deeper level,
109 See Miller, The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests, supra note 20, at 534-35; SMITH, supra
note 22, at 3.
i o For example, "the recent auction of Van Gogh's Irises for over $50 million, for exam-
ple, not only set the price for the Irises, but also affected the price of all Van Gogh's paintings
and all Postimpressionist paintings in general." SMITH, supra note 22, at 3.
I I I Kershen, supra note 38, at 166.
112 Miller, America Singing, supra note 1 o, at 783.
113 See, e.g. Miller, The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests, supra note 2o, at 534.
114 Id. at 535.
1 15 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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if these overstatements are not considered fraudulent per se, they are, at
the very least, a vehicle to enable subsequent fraudulent behavior by the
rebate purchaser. The hyping or misreporting of auction prices can be and
has been an effective means of defrauding lenders into providing loans
far in excess of the actual value of the collateral provided by the debtor
as security for that loan. 1 6 A similar fraudulent scheme can be conducted
via the resale of percentages of the rebated horse, utilizing the overstated
sales price as a "fair and impartial" assessment of the value of the partial
share offered for purchase."7 Although neither of these practices are the
necessary result of the use of rebate agreements, they are made infinitely
more manageable by their existence, and thus provide an additional reason
to limit their use.
C. Market Price
Implicit in subsections A and B above is the notion that a properly
conducted auction functions to establish an incontrovertible fair price (or
market value) for the item being sold.' All else being equal, an item sold
at auction will be awarded to the bidder who values it the most highly, at a
price one unit" 9 greater than that of the second highest valuation.' This
price is considered to be both fair and accurate because it is the direct
result of an efficient market process in which the knowledge of all parties
present at the auction is impounded into the final price.' This price
discovery process is entirely ineffective however, if a particular bidder is
entitled to a percentage rebate on the announced price of his final bid. In
such an instance, the legitimate market price of the horse (or good) sold
116 For an instructive discussion of the use of auction price misreporting and or "ques-
tionable' auction practices generally, see ANN HAGEDORN AUERBACH, WILD RIDE: THE RISE &
TRAGIC FALL OF CALUMET FARMS 198, zoo-o6 (Henry Holt & Company L.L.C. 1995).
I 17 See Kershen,supra note 38, at 147, 166.
1 18 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 107, at 746-47; McAfee & McMillan, supra note 107,
at 721-22.
I 19 What is meant by a "unit of value' depends on the size of the bid increments ac-
cepted by the auctioneer at that particular point in the auction. If the asking price of an item
is approximately $ioo, an auctioneer is likely to accept a bid of $io5; if the asking price is
$i,ooo,ooo he may be inclined to only accept bids in minimum increments of $1oo,ooo and
so forth.
120 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 107, at 707.
121 Id. at 72 1. "In the common value model, the bidders lack complete information about
the item's true value; each bidder has different partial information. However, even though no
single bidder has perfect information, it can be shown that, if there is perfect competition in
the bidding, the selling price reflects all of the bidder's private information. If information is
sufficiently dispersed among the bidders then the selling price converges to the item's true
value as the number of bidders becomes arbitrarily large .... With perfect competition, the
price is equal to the true value even though no individual in the economy knows what the true
value is and no communication among the bidders takes place." Id. at 721-22.
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can be no higher than the final bid of the good faith underbidder (buyer Y's
$550,000 bid in our hypothetical), and is likely lower still."' 2 The sales price
in such an auction (if defined to mean either the amount of the final bid or
the amount actually paid) is clearly not the price that an unbiased market
would have generated as there is a defect in the flow of information that is
used to establish the market price.
This procedural distortion requires little additional explanation when
the rebate bidder is the eventual purchaser, as was the case in subsections
A and B. But, what is perhaps less clear is the pernicious effect of rebate
bidding when a third party purchases the horse subject to the escalating
bids of a rebate bidder. In such an instance it can be argued that there is
no damage to the bona fide purchaser as he is not compelled to continue
to bid, but instead, does so based on a rational assessment that the value
of property to him merits the increased price. I"3 Despite its facial appeal,
the flaw in this argument is the assumption that there is a standard of value
independent of the wishes and wants of the bidders themselves.2 4 In most
real auctions, participants seldom have established economic preferences;
they do not enter the auction knowing the specific prices they are willing
to pay,"2 ' and even if they do they frequently fail to abide by these self-
imposed limits. (In fact, it is the goal of the auctioneer to ensure that they
do not).12 6 An auction does not simply reflect the predetermined value of
an item-it is the auction process itself that determines its value., 7
122 According to Professor Kershen's analysis of the UCC, the crucial point in any pat-
tern of bids entered at an auction is the point at which the seller intervenes in the auction to
submit a rebate bid. See Kershen, supra note 38, at 137 n.44. Beginning with the first rebate
bid, that bid and all later bids, even those from good faith bidders should be considered bad
faith bids because the bidder is either a rebate bid or a bid induced by a rebate bid. See id.
Hence, after the entry of a rebate bid it is legally irrelevant as to the number of good faith bid-
ders who continue to bid or the order in which further bids from the rebate bidder and or good
faith bidders are submitted. See id. This view appears to be in accord with that of Professors
Hawkland and DuBoff. See W. HAWKLAND, A TRiANSACTIONAL GuIDE TO THE UCC 40 (1964);
DuBoff, supra note 50, at 506-07.
123 This was the approach consistently advocated by Lord Chancellor Loughborough: "I
feel vast difficulty to compass the reasoning, that a person does not follow his own judgment,
because other persons bid." Peck v. List, 1883 WL 3306, at *8 (W. Va. Dec. 2o, 1883) (quoting
Conolly v. Parsons, 3 Vesey 625, 627).
124 Staines v. Shore, 16 Pa. 200, 203 (1851).
125 See Cramton, supra note 107, at 745.
126 See DuBoff, supra note 5o , at 504 ("Auctioneers try to charge the atmosphere with
their banter, promoting spontaneous bidding which results in bidders acting before they have
had a chance to reflect. Impulsive competitive bidding is known as auction fever and may
result in an individual acquiring an object for a price which exceeds the amount he would be
willing to spend if he had an opportunity to think before buying.").
127 SMITH, supra note 22, at I6 ("Rather than using consensual principles of what con-
stitutes objective worth to establish price, auctions, through competitive bidding, seek to es-
tablish standards of worth through price"). If that were not the case, if value were somehow
certain, there would be no rational reason to sell the item at auction as one would attain the
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This notion that bidders' valuations may to some extent be correlated
with each other is captured by the economic concept of affiliation.1 18 The
general concept is deceptively simple and is based primarily on a notion of
justifiable reliance: in any auction that combines private and common value
elements (i.e. subjective and objective standards of valuation), the fact that
a single bidder perceives the item's value to be particularly high makes it
far more likely that other bidders will also perceive the value to be high,
regardless of their previous inclinations about its value.'2 9 This reliance on
the opinion of others is particularly pronounced when there is a legitimate
resale market for the good being auctioned (as there is in horse sales), or
more generally, when a single bidder does not possess a monopoly on the
relevant information needed to assess the item's value (again, a truism in
the thoroughbred sales context).130 A related behavioral effect of affiliation
is the psychological comfort or certainty that such a process generates. A
given bidder is reassured by each subsequent third party bid that others
have valued the property in a similar manner to him and are willing to
pay an equivalent sum.13 1 This effect cannot be underestimated when one
considers that thoroughbred bidders are frequently asked to spend well in
excess of a million dollars on an animal that is often less than a year old and
has never stepped foot on a racetrack or worn a saddle or bit. In sum, open
bidding competition reveals information that bidders use in revising their
estimates of value. Since a bid is deemed to provide information about an
item's value that is relied upon by good faith purchasers, any defect in that
information (i.e. the fact that a particular bid may be subject to a rebate),
necessarily impairs the purchaser's ability to accurately assess the item's
worth. It is therefore no answer to say that an individual bid voluntarily
or that the property was actually worth in the market the sum he bid for it,
because while bidding that individual was laboring under a misapprehension
that others had honestly valued the property near the same price. 13 1 If
one is to assume that a good faith bid is a "statement" of purported value
utilized by purchasers to make buying decisions, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that a rebate bid is, in fact, a material misstatement that is made
"for the purpose of inducing another to act.., in reliance upon it." 133 This
is the very definition of a fraudulent misrepresentation, and thus this cause
same price through a private sale without the attendant costs.
128 For an explanation of affiliation, see McAfee & McMillan, supra note 107, at 705-06.
129 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 107, at 722.
130 Id.
131 Id. "If one takes the highest bid of the others as the market price, then it is impos-
sible to overbid by more than one bid increment. Indeed, at the time the final bid is placed,
the winner knows that others are willing to pay more for the item. Raising the bid in this state
seems especially attractive." Id.
132 Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. 134, 152 (1850).
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
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of action may provide a conceivable remedy for a purchaser who has paid
an inflated sum at an auction sale based on rebate bidding practices. At
the very least, the parallel drawn should be of some concern to those who
purport to extol the virtues of ethical auction practices.
D. Public Policy
The importance of the thoroughbred industry to the state of Kentucky
has played a significant role in the judicial resolution of auction-related
legal disputes. Auction sales generally, (regardless of the type of property
to be offered), are considered a "public concern," and as such, Kentucky's
courts have indicated that they "will not tolerate any fraudulent, unfair, or
deceitful conduct in such sales."' ' Based on legislative and judicial fiat
it appears that the foregoing is doubly so when the item to be auctioned
is a thoroughbred horse.135  The state legislature has explicitly stated
that it is its intent to foster and encourage the horse breeding industry in
the Commonwealth, and to ensure that the industry conducts itself with
the utmost of honesty and integrity.'36 Judicial decisions, beginning with
Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., have drawn from this instruction and have
attributed a public interest to all parties involved in an equine transaction.'37
In the Chernick case itself, the Kentucky Court of Appeals utilized this very
rationale to impose a fiduciary duty on auction companies 138 and to validate
the imposition of punitive damages on the seller of a horse at an auction
sale. 139  Similarly, in Mizen Arabians v. Pyramid Society, a federal court
applying Kentucky law clearly indicated that it had tailored its decision so
as to be "consistent with the overall policy goal of maintaining the integrity
134 Robenson v. Yann, 5 S.W.zd 271, 274 (Ky. 1928); see also Worswick v. Switzer, 778
S.W.zd 226, 228 (Ky. App. 1998); Burdon v. Seitz, 267 S.W. 219, 220 (Ky. 1924); Osborn v.
Apperson Lodge, 281 S.W. 500, 502 (Ky. 1926).
135 See Paul Reynolds, Note, Chernick v. Fasig Tipton: A Caveat to the Horse Trader, 74
Ky. L.J. 889, 922 (1985). "We agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth of Kentucky
maintains an international reputation for excellence in the equine industry. The conduct of
one of the Commonwealth's foremost consignors of breeding stock is not to be reviewed at
level lower than that of strict scrutiny." Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885,
890 (Ky. App. 1996).
136 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.215 (2007).
137 Miller, The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests, supra note 2o, at 550.
138 See Chernick, 703 S.W.2d at 890 ("[T]he trial court found, and we concur, that although
under the terms of the consignment contract the Chernicks were responsible for the accuracy
of all information contained within the catalog of sale, Fasig-Tipton had a fiduciary duty
to the purchaser and to the Commonwealth's most prestigious and valued industry to use
ordinary care to ensure that its catalog and/or announcements were as accurate and compre-
hensive as possible").
139 See id. at 889-90.
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of Kentucky's leading industry."'" Finally, in the partnership case of
Marsh v. Gentry, the unspoken imperative of the majority decision was the
utility of encouraging outsiders to invest in the Kentucky thoroughbred
industry. 4 ' In his concurring decision in the matter, Justice Palmore
made that fact explicit, noting that "the horse industry in Kentucky is far
too important for questionable dealing to be tolerated by the courts."14
Therefore, even if one is to believe that a seller-rebate agreement may
be generally permissible in the abstract, it does not necessarily follow that
such agreements are permissible in the auction sale of a thoroughbred
horse in Kentucky. Indeed, if a seller-rebate agreement is of questionable
legality, then in Kentucky that question must be answered in a manner
that is consistent with the promotion of the thoroughbred horse industry.
The recent attempts to alleviate questionable auction practices, such as
dual agency'43 and undisclosed ownership, 144 indicate an industry-wide
consensus that the elimination of these practices is the means to accomplish
this goal. The invalidation of seller-rebate agreements serves this very
same purpose, and thus seems to be a mandated course of action if ever
presented for judicial resolution.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the use of seller-rebate agreements at thoroughbred auction
sales results in numerous pernicious effects. Such agreements undermine
the accepted notion that a price established at auction is the result of free
and fair competition, and casts doubt on whether the recorded auction price
is truly an accurate reflection of the market value of the particular item. The
published sales results in such a case mislead all who read them, leading to
an inappropriately appraised equine market and the opportunity for fraud
that such a distortion presents. Further, we have seen that public policy in
Kentucky is to be dictated by what is best for the thoroughbred industry
-one cannot make a persuasive argument that the above effects are in any
way positive, and thus one cannot argue that seller-rebate agreements are
consistent with this goal of encouraging investment in Kentucky's leading
industry. In fact, a decision to legislate the abolition of such agreements
(similar to the recent abolition of dual agency) is more compatible with this
policy initiative and is a tact that should be undertaken after consultation
140 Mizen Arabians v. Pyramid Soc'y, 821 F.2d. 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1987).
141 Miller, America Singing, supra note io, at 819.
142 Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Ky. 1982) (Palmore, J., concurring).
143 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(3) (2007).
L44 See Ray Paulick, Kentucky Bill Would Require Ownership, Medical Disclosures at Sales,
THE BLOOD-HoRsE, Feb. 8, 2007, available at http://news.bloodhorse.com/index-prt.asp; Ryan




with industry decision makers. It is imperative that the industry attract
new investors if it is to thrive in an increasingly competitive entertainment
market-"that [is] impossible to do if the world views you as an industry
without integrity." '
145 Meehan, supra note 5 (quoting Julie Goodman, attorney for the United States
Equestrian Foundation).
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